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TORTS UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OF PHOTOGRAPH INVASION
OF RIGHT OF PRIVACY- Defendant newspaper published an advertisement con-

taining a picture of plaintiff, a radio artist, in a bathing suit, under the mistaken
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belief that it was a picture of a member of a vaudeville troupe whose name appeared in the advertisement, and who was described as an "exotic red-haired
Venus" who endorsed a certain brand of whole-wheat bread as a means of "keeping that sylph-like figure." Plaintiff alleged that the vaudeville act was a "sensual
performance or sex parade" and was composed of the "cheapest class of chorus
girls." Held, that the advertisement was an invasion of plaintiff's right of
privacy but was not ground for an action for libel. In the absence of proof of
special damages however, only nominal damages could be recovered on the first
cause of action. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E.
55 (1938).
The principal case is another addition to the expanding field of law involving the so-called right of privacy.1 Although early cases were decided on the
basis of an invasion of some orthodox right of property,2 or breach of trust or
confidence,S and this confusion has not entirely disappeared,' the principal case
recognizes the right to privacy as a legally protected interest in itself.G A point
1
Attention was first drawn to this branch of law in 1890 by an article in the
Harvard Law Review. Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890). Since that date, the doctrine has received recognition both by courts
and legislatures. See Pavesich v. New England L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68
(1905); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (19n); Douglas v. Stokes, 149
Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912); Schulman v. Whitaker, n7 La. 704, 42 So. 227
(1906); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927); Edison v. Edison
Polyform Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907); Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co.,
(C. C. Mass. 1893) 57 F. 434; 8 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1916), §§ 50,
51 [N. Y. Laws (1903), c. 132, held constitutional in Rhodes v. Sperry & H. Co.,
193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097 (1908)]; Cal. Stat. (1899),p.28,(PenalCode,§ 258),
repealed by Cal. Stat. (1915), p. 761. In some jurisdictions the right has been categorically denied. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E.
442, 59 L. R. A. 478 (1902) (prior to the present statute); Atkinson v. John E.
Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, So N. W. 285 (1899); Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I.
13, 73 A. 97 (1909); Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 91, II7 P. 594 (19n).
The growth of the law has been commented on extensively by the writers. 3 I L. R. A.
283 (1896); 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) n37 (19n); 43 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1929);
28 YALE L. J. 269 (1919); 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 306 (1929); Ragland, "The Right
of Privacy," 17 KY. L. J. 85 (1928); Green, "The Right of Privacy," 27 ILL. L.
REV. 237 (1933); Larremore, "The Law of Privacy," 12 CoL. L. REV. 693 (1912).
2
Jones v. Topling, 12 C. B. N. S. 864, 142 Eng. Rep. 1367 (1862); Moore v.
New York Elev. Ry., 130 N. Y. 523, 29 N. E. 997 (1892); Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer
(II N. Y. Super.) 379 (1855).
8
Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N. Y. S. 908 (1894); Corliss v. E.W. Walker
Co., (C. C. Mass. 1894) 64 F. 280; Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345
(1888).
4
Murden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 124 S. W. 1076 (19n); Edison v.
Edison Polyform Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907); Bennett v. Gusdorf,
IOI Mont. 39, 53 P. (2d) 91 (1935).
G 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938). See Pound, "Interests of Personality,"
28 HARV. L. REV. 343 (1915).
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of departure in the principal case, however, from others recognizing the right,
is the requirement of special damages. Although no other case involving the
right of privacy has been found where this requirement was made, the cases
of slander 6 are somewhat analogous, and possibly influenced the court. The rule
that the action may be maintained without proof of special damages involves
a recognition of the fact that one may be injured mentally as well as physically.
In other situations, damages are allowed for mental suffering where it is once
shown physical injury has occurred,7 and in at least one situation an obvious
fiction is resorted to in order to allow damages for an injury to one's pride and
honor. 8 To allow damages for this sort of injury generally, however, would be to
encourage vexatious suits and actions brought for fancied injuries. 9 It was precisely this objection which led some courts to refuse to recognize the right of
privacy at all.10 The principal case, therefore, could be said to represent a compromise between two divergent points of view. However, in view of the obvious
fact that one may suffer as much from injury to feelings as injury to body, and
that damages for the latter type are often highly speculative, it would seem
highly doubtful if this argument should serve either to deny the entire doctrine,
or to so emasculate it by the requirement of proof of special damages as to render
it virtually ineffective. It is not to be inferred, however, that the doctrine is
without limits.11 Although carried to rather unusual lengths in a few isolated
6 Historically, pecuniary loss to the plaintiff has been the gist of the action for
sland~r or libel, requiring proof of special damages except where monetary loss is conclusively presumed. However, in the case of a printed invasion of the right of privacy,
no reason is seen why the same conclusive presumption of pecuniary damage should not
be applied as in the case of libel. See ToWNsHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 3d ed., 106
{1877).
7 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Miller, 120 Ga. 453, 47 S. E. 959 (1904);
Ousley v. Hampe, 128 Iowa 675, 105 N. W. 122 (1905).
8 For example, the damages allowed for loss of services in seduction cases. Evidence showing there was no actual loss of service will not even be admitted. Anderson
v. Regan, 8 Ill. 583 {1846).
9 In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538 at 545, 64 N. E.
442 (1902), Parker, C. J., said, "I have gone only far enough to barely suggest the
vast field of litigation which would necessarily be opened up should this court hold that
privacy exists as a legal right enforceable in equity by injunction and by damages where
they seem necessary to give complete relief."
10 See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442,
59 L. R. A. 478 (1902); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 88
N. W. 285 {1899); Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I. 14, 73 A. 97 (1909); Hillman v.
Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 91, 117 P. 594 (1911).
11 Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 {1890),
give the following limitations to the doctrine: (I) The right to privacy does not prohibit
any publication of matter which is of public or general interest. (2) The right to
privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter, though in its nature private,
when the publication is made under circumstances which would render it a privileged
communication according to the law of slander and libel. (3) The law would probably
not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of
special damages. {4) The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by
the individual, or with his consent.
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cases,12 courts have generally refused to carry it to extremes,18 and the very
dearth of cases indicates that the doctrine is not being misused to any great
extent. Although the line has not been drawn by the courts, a point of distinction might be made between those breaches of the right of privacy due to mere
negligence and those intentionally produced.14 In the latter type of case where,
as in the principal case, another's picture is used for a commercial purpose, the
case becomes closely analogous to the "free ride" cases, in which relief is given
on an entirely different theory.15 Where a newspaper is the offending party,
leniency might be shown because of the public policy involved,1 6 as in the somewhat analogous cases of defamation and negligent misrepresentation.11 In regard
to the question of libel in the principal case, the decision of the court would not
•
18
seem open to question.
James T-V. Mehaffy
12 The doctrine was invoked in the case of an unwarranted entrance into plaintiff's stateroom on shipboard in Candler v. Byfield, 160 Ga. 732, 129 S. E. 57 (1925).
See Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542 (1896); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky.
225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931); Williams v. O'Shaughnessy, (N. Y. S. Ct. 1918)
172 N. Y. S. 574.
18 See Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 5 5 I, l l 7 S. W. 746 ( l 909). Cf. State ex rel.
Bruns v. Clausmier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541 (1900); Schuyler v. Curtis, 64 Hun
594, 19 N. Y. S. 264 (1892); Hodgeman v. Aken, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. u22
(1915); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929); Melvin
v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
H However, see Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 at 218 (1890), where it is said: "Personal ill-will is not an ingredient of the
offense, any more than in an ordinary case of trespass to person or to property...• The
invasion of the privacy that is to be protected is equally complete and equally injurious,
whether the motives by which the speaker or writer are actuated are, taken by themselves, culpable or not; just as the damage to character, and to some extent the tendency to provoke a breach of the peace, is equally the result of defamation without
regard to the motives leading to its publication. Viewed as a wrong to the individual,
this rule is the same pervading the whole law of torts, by which one is held responsible
for his intentional acts, even though they are committed with no sinister intent; and
viewed as a wrong to society, it is the same principle adopted in a large category of
statutory offenses."
15 See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68
(1918).
16 See KVOS v. Associated Press, (D. C. Wash. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 279.
17 See SrnBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS 152 (1934); HALE
and BENSON, THE LAW OF THE PRESS, 2d ed., 126 et seq. (1933); Carpenter, "Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation," 24 ILL. L.
REv. 749 (1930); 31 CoL. L. REv. 858 (1931).
18 The court said: "To recommend a legitimate article of merchandise and an
item of daily food is not likely to subject one to ridicule or contempt. Vaudevilles and
revues are recognized methods of furnishing public entertainment. We consider that it
would be a strained and unreasonable interpretation of the law and the facts to hold
that the mere representation that a person is a member of a legitimate and well recognized type of professional entertainment will subject that person to public hatred and
obloquy. To do so would in effect hold that such type of entertainment is disreputable
and those connected therewith are persons of ill-repute. This would constitute an
unwarranted reflection upon and condemnation of .many young ladies who earn their
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living in this manner. It may be that some connected with such groups are not all they
should be, but such is the case with all other professions and callings." 212 N. C. 780,
195 S. E. 55 at 62 (1938).

